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FATAL FOETAL ABNORMALITY, IRISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND 
MELLET V IRELAND 
 
Fiona de Londras 
Professor of Global Legal Studies, University of Birmingham 
 
Abstract 
 
Under the Irish Constitution abortion is available only where the life of the 
pregnant woman is at risk. The provision has long been criticized for failing 
to respect women’s autonomy, and in Mellet v Ireland the UN Human Rights 
Committee found that Amanda Jane Mellet, who traveled to Liverpool to 
access abortion following a finding that her foetus suffered a fatal 
abnormality, had suffered a violation of her rights under the ICCPR. In this 
commentary I demonstrate the value of Mellet when compared to the possible 
legal findings in such circumstances under both the Constitution and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and argue that the findings are not 
restricted to cases of fatal foetal abnormality. Rather, the Committee’s 
decision illustrates the suffering that all women in Ireland who travel to access 
abortion experience, arguably constituting a violation of their right to be free 
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. On that reading, Mellet signifies 
the need to implement a comprehensive rethink of Irish abortion law 
including, but going beyond, access to abortion in cases of fatal foetal 
abnormality. 
 
Keywords 
Abortion—Irish constitution—international human rights law—the 8th 
Amendment 
 
Ireland’s abortion law regime is notoriously restrictive. Shaped by a constitutional provision 
inserted by referendum 1  in 1983 (Article 40.3.3, or the 8th Amendment), Irish law permits 
abortion only where the life, as opposed to the health, of the woman is at real and substantial 
risk, where that risk can in probability only be averted by termination of the pregnancy, and 
where the foetus has not reached viability.2 From this it is clear that women in Ireland can access 
lawful abortion only in the very rarest of circumstances. Whether a woman ‘qualifies’ is 
1 According the Article 46 of the Constitution of Ireland, referendum is the only mechanism for formal 
amendment of the constitutional text. 
2 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1. 
                                                        
determined by application of the procedural and substantive rules in the Protection of Life 
During Pregnancy Act 2013, which was introduced following both the death of Savita 
Halappanavar3 and the European Court of Human Rights decision in A, B & C v Ireland.4 While 
that Act (finally) clarified how decisions as to access to constitutionally permitted abortions are to 
be made, 5  the process it imposes is onerous 6  and the substantive limitations of the 8th 
Amendment are, of course, not addressed by its content. Irish women, in other words, remain 
extremely restricted in terms of their ability to make real choices as to whether to continue a 
pregnancy in circumstances other than the (rare) cases where their lives are in danger and they 
happen to be pregnant (the pregnancy does not have to be the cause of the risk to life to ‘qualify’ 
for access to abortion under Article 40.3.3 or under the 2013 Act).  
 
While this is clearly problematic in and of itself, one of the key areas in which the unreasonable 
constraints imposed by the constitutional provision are now being widely acknowledged is that of 
so-called ‘Fatal Foetal Abnormalities’. This paper considers the situation of women in Ireland 
who find themselves carrying a foetus with such conditions and, in particular, the recent decision 
of the UN Human Rights Committee in Mellet v Ireland 7  finding that in such circumstances 
women’s human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be 
violated. In doing so, I argue that Mellet demonstrates the incompatibility of Irish law with 
international human rights law in and beyond circumstances of fatal foetal abnormality, adding 
weight to the call for substantial and comprehensive constitutional change in this field in Ireland.   
 
I. THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF “THE UNBORN” 
 
The background and implications of the 8th Amendment to the Irish Constitution are generally 
well known and in any case widely reported,8 so that only a short account is required here. In 
3 R Lentin, “a woman died: abortion and the politics of birth in Ireland” (2013) 105 Feminist Review 130. 
4  [2010] ECHR 2032. On the background to the introduction of the legislation see C O’Sullivan, J 
Schweppe & E Spain, “Article 40.3.3 and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013: The Impetus 
for, and Process of, Legislative Change” (2013) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
5 Since 1983 it has been clear that women were entitled to access abortion in at least some cases in Ireland, 
but there was no way for medics to properly assess whether a patient fell into those circumstances and, 
thus, to determined whether they would be working lawfully should they provide abortion care. This 
caused what the European Court of Human Rights described as a “chilling effect” on medical practice in 
A, B & C v Ireland supra n 4). 
6 For critiques of the Act see, for example, C Murray, “The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: 
Suicide, Dignity and the Irish discourse on abortion” (2016) Social and Legal Studies (forthcoming); F de 
Londras, “Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale from Ireland” (2015) 22 Michigan Journal of 
Gender and the Law 243, 249-252 (“Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights”); M Enright et. al., “Abortion Law 
Reform in Ireland: A Model for Change” (2015) 5 feminsits@law 
7 Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, UNHRC decision, CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013, 9 June 2016. 
8 See generally J Schweppe (ed), The Unborn Child, Article 40.3.3 and Abortion in Ireland: 25 Years of Protection? 
(2008, Dublin; Liffey Press); R Fletcher, “Reproductive Justice and the Right to Life of the Unborn” in J 
                                                        
1937, when the Irish Constitution was introduced following a plebiscite of the people, there was 
no mention of a foetal right to life in the text. This is hardly surprising; such a right did not figure 
explicitly in any constitutional text at that time. Furthermore, there was a clear criminal 
prohibition on abortion in the form of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 so that, even in 
the post-colonial ascent of Catholic constitutionalism that was evident in the text of the 
Constitution and in constitutional practice in Ireland, abortion did not figure heavily as a topic 
for consideration. So it remained until the late 1970s and early 1980s. By that time, the Irish 
Supreme Court had made two extremely important developments in constitutional jurisprudence.  
 
First, in the case of Ryan v Attorney General,9 it had confirmed the concept of unenumerated rights 
in Ireland, i.e. rights that although not mentioned in the text of the Constitution have 
constitutional protection because they are antecedent (sometimes ‘natural’) rights that can be 
identified by reference to the spirit of the Constitution (and its preambular concentration on 
prudence, justice and charity10). This case demonstrated the ‘activist’ capacities of Irish judges;11 
or what others might call their willingness to recognise, embrace and act upon their role in 
shaping a developing constitutional order.12 The second development was the ‘discovery’ within 
the enumerated right to privacy of a right to marital privacy, encompassing a right not to be 
unduly interfered with by the state when making decisions as to family planning. In the case of 
McGee v Attorney General13 the Court had struck down the criminalisation of the importation of 
spermicidal jelly on the grounds that it violated this constitutionally protected right.  
 
For conservative lawyers and activists who were keen observers of other courts, and particularly 
the United States Supreme Court, these two developments posed a clear and particular risk: that 
the Irish Supreme Court might strike down the criminalisation of abortion in the 1861 Act on the 
basis of a progressive interpretation of the right to privacy following on from McGee (which they 
analogized to Griswold v Connecticut14), leading to an ‘Irish’ Roe v Wade.15 And so they organised,16 
Schweppe (ed), The Unborn Child, Article 40.3.3 and Abortion in Ireland: 25 Years of Protection? (2008, Dublin; 
Liffey Press); R Fletcher, “Pro-Life Absolutes, Feminist Challenges: The Fundamentalist Narrative of Irish 
Abortion Law 1986–1992” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1; J P O’Carroll, “Bishops, Knights—and 
Pawns? Traditional Thought and the Irish Abortion Referendum Debate of 1983” (1991) 6 Irish Political 
Studies 53; U Barry, “Abortion in the Republic of Ireland” (1988) 29 Feminist Review 57. 
9 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] 1 IR 264. 
10 The Preamble to the Irish Constitution notes that the Constitution is adopted, inter alia, as part of the 
People’s attempt to “promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity”. 
11 D Gwynn Morgan, A Judgment too Far? Judicial Activism and the Constitution (Cork, Cork University Press; 
2001). 
12 F de Londras, “In Defence of Judicial Innovation and Constitutional Evolution” in Laura Cahillane, 
James Gallen & Tom Hickey, Judges, Politics and the Irish Constitution (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press; 2016) forthcoming. 
13 McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284. 
14 Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965). 
                                                                                                                                                              
and a key focus of their organisation was to advocate for a referendum that would place foetal 
rights into the Constitution thus absolutely foreclosing any possibility of a Roe-like decision. This 
ambition, the pervasiveness of Catholicism (as an institution and a mindset) across political, 
medical, legal and everyday life, and a period of intense political upheaval in Ireland all conspired 
to lead to the 8th Amendment being proposed to the People, and to its adoption by a healthy 
majority in the referendum itself.17 As a result, Article 40.3.3 was inserted into the Constitution, 
where it remains. It reads: 
 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, 
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
 
Since then explicit rights to travel for the purposes of accessing abortion, and to access 
information about abortion (both of which had been restricted as a result of expansive judicial 
interpretation of the 8th Amendment18) have been added to the Constitution in 1992. However, 
the core purpose of the 8th Amendment—preventing access to abortion in the Republic of 
Ireland—has largely been achieved. As a result of it, women cannot ordinarily access abortion in 
Ireland, abortion is framed as a clash of foetal human rights and maternal human rights, and no 
amount of judicial innovation or activism can effectively mitigate the implications for women. 
 
II. FATAL FOETAL ABNORMALITIES   
 
That is not to say, however, that the circumstances in which women’s choices are so 
fundamentally constrained by the 8th Amendment are homogenous, or are considered thus by 
politicians and others. In Ireland, as elsewhere, there is a discursive distinction between what are 
implicitly considered to be ‘good’ (or at less ‘less bad’) abortions and others (“abortion on 
demand”, as the phrase goes).  The former category includes abortions accessed by women who 
find themselves in situations where the foetus they are carrying has what has come to be known 
as a ‘fatal foetal abnormality’.19 For reasons that are, of course, not unproblematic, the political 
15 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973). 
16 J P O’Carroll, ‘”Bishops, Knights—and Pawns? Traditional Thought and the Irish Abortion Referendum 
Debate of 1983” (1991) 6 Irish Political Studies 53. 
17 T Hesketh, The Second Partitioning of Ireland: The Abortion Referendum of 1983 (Dublin, Brandsma Books; 
1990). 
18  For a full account of the jurisprudential development of Article 40.3.3 see F de Londras, 
“Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights”, supra n 6. 
19 This phrase is not universally accepted in Ireland. For example, (now former)  Senator Paul Bradford has 
described the phrase as “a very strong weapon” in campaigns for abortion law reform. According to him, 
“There are no such babies as babies with fatal foetal abnormalities. There are babies with serious, 
profound, life-threatening and life-limiting conditions, but they are still human beings”. Order of Business, 
                                                                                                                                                              
establishment and large parts of the public have become especially aware of and inclined towards 
resolving the difficulties caused by the 8th Amendment for women in these situations.20  
 
This is not without dissenters, of course; for the architects and staunch supporters of the 
constitutional status quo there is no differentiation in either the constitutional position or the 
moral analysis between these pregnancies and others; and thus there is no reason why a pregnant 
woman should be able to exercise a choice to terminate a pregnancy because of the fatal foetal 
abnormality. 21  This position has the merit of moral consistency, but the demerit of apathy 
towards the pregnant woman who is perceived by many or presented as making a more difficult, 
upsetting, and blameless (or morally unblameworthy) decision when she elects to abort than a 
woman who is not in this situation. Notwithstanding that apparently widespread perception, and 
support for women in these situations being able to choose abortion should they wish to,22 the 
law as it stands is considered to prohibit access to abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality, 
although it is not entirely clear that the 8th Amendment actually requires this. 
 
The text of the 8th Amendment clearly requires the state to “defend and vindicate” the right to 
life of the unborn only “so far as it is practicable to do so”. It is at least arguable that where the 
foetus has a condition that is, as the phrase goes, “incompatible with life” there would be no 
constitutional imperative for the state to protect it to the detriment of women’s constitutional 
rights taken in toto (rather than focusing only a narrow foetal right to life v woman’s right to life 
construction). This is further suggested by the fact that it has been established in the 
jurisprudence of the superior courts that the state is not required to do that which is futile in 
order to fulfill Article 40.3.3.23 And so, at least on a textual basis, one might argue that there is 
space to permit abortions in cases of fatal foetal abnormality within the current constitutional 
arrangement.24 However, that argument holds only if Article 40.3.3 is considered as protecting life 
as opposed to being born for the foetus, and a quality of life as opposed to not dying for the pregnant 
Seanad Éireann, 1 December 2015. The phrasing is widely rejected by anti-abortion campaigners. See, for 
example, N Uí Bhriain, “Changes to abortion law should be decided by referendum—with balanced 
information for voters”, TheJournal.ie, 16 October 2014. Available at 
http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/abortion-laws-ireland-fatal-foetal-abnormality-1726193-Oct2014/ (2 
July 2016). 
20 In a Red C poll in January 2016 61% of respondents supported permitting abortion in cases of fatal 
foetal abnormality, as opposed to 48% who supported removal of the 8th Amendment per se, 78% 
supporting permitting abortion in cases of rape or incest, and 41% supporting permitting abortion 
whenever the pregnant woman considered it necessary: D Buckley, “78% of Irish people in support for 
abortion change”, The Examiner, 22 January 2016. 
21 Supra n 19. 
22 Supra n 20. 
23 See, for example, PP v Health Service Executive [2014] IEHC 622. 
24 See “Ruth Fletcher's Submission to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health”, Human Rights in 
Ireland, 22 May 2013. Available at http://humanrights.ie/criminal-justice/guestpost-ruth-fletchers-
submission-to-the-oireachtas-abortion-hearings/ (2 July 2016). But c.f. Roche a Roche [2010] 2 IR 321 
                                                                                                                                                              
woman. Lamentably, however, that is not how Article 40.3.3 has been developed, interpreted, 
applied, and embedded in Irish medico-legal practice.25 The right to life of the foetus is, more 
accurately put, a right to be born so that if there is any chance whatsoever—no matter how 
slim—that the foetus might be born alive, that is sufficient to engage the protection of the state 
for its rights under Article 40.3.3.26 Irish courts have made it abundantly clear that this is so even 
if the foetus will live only for a spit second, and quite regardless of the quality of life that the 
born child will have as a result of its medical condition.27 A moment’s breath is enough to realise 
the foetus’ status as a constitutional rights bearer.  
 
While this is not an inevitable interpretation of the Constitution, it is a culturally embedded one. 
Bills proposing to allow abortion in these situations have come before the Oireachtas (Irish 
Parliament) on a number of occasions,28 but the government appears to be of the view that it 
should follow the (unpublished) advice of the Attorney General that this would be 
unconstitutional, presumably based on an analysis very similar to the one just outlined.29  
 
There is, it seems, little governmental attitude for passing one of these Bills and allowing the Irish 
Supreme Court to decide whether the law as it stands can accommodate it. In spite of the general 
(and advisable) disinclination to legislate against the advice of the Attorney General, in some 
ways this is a surprising decision. Not only would legislating resolve an immediate issue on which 
there is something close to unanimity without the need for a (no doubt ugly) referendum and 
thus, potentially, buy the Government some time (so to speak), but the Irish constitutional 
architecture offers what seems an ideal vehicle for legislating in such constitutionally ambiguous 
areas without introducing mass uncertainty through the Article 26 procedure.  
 
25 For a full articulation of this see F de Londras, “Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights”, supra n. 6. 
26 PP v Health Service Executive, supra n 23. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Amendment) 2013, Bill No. 115/2013 introduced by Clare 
Daly TD; Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Amendment) 2015, Bill No. 20/2015 introduced by 
Michael McNamara TD. Following Mellet Mick Wallace T.D. introduced a private members bill that had 
precisely the same wording as that of Clare Daly TD: Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
(Amendment) (no 2) 2013 Bill. This was also defeated. 
29 Since the spring of 2016 the Irish government has been a loose coalition of Fine Gael and a number of 
independent deputies some of whom are members of Cabinet. It is widely reported that while the Attorney 
General’s advice has not changed (i.e. remains that a law to allow abortion in cases of foetal fatal 
abnormality would be unconstitutional), a number of these members of Cabinet are not entirely in 
agreement. See, for example, N O’Connor & P Ryan, “Cabinet split as Independents want free vote on 
abortion bill”, Irish Independent, 29 June 2016. Nevertheless, when a vote was called (after Mellet) on the 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Amendment) (no 2) 2013 Bill (ibid), some Independent members 
of the Cabinet voted to support it: M O’Halloran & S Bardon, “Fatal foetal abnormalities Bill defeated in 
Dáil vote”, Irish Times, 7 July 2016. 
                                                        
Article 26 of the Irish Constitution allows the President, following consultation with his Council 
of State, to send a Bill to the Supreme Court before he signs it into law. The Supreme Court, 
sitting in a panel of five, would then undertake an anticipatory constitutional review under Article 
26, i.e. appoint lawyers for all potential interests that might be invoked should the law be 
introduced, who then work up and argue all possible claims for unconstitutionality that they can 
imagine. The Supreme Court would then decide whether the Bill, if passed into law, would be 
unconstitutional or not based on these abstract and hypothetical arguments. No witnesses are 
heard, a single judgment is issued by the Court, and the decision is made within sixty days of 
Article 26 being invoked. If the Bill survives this scrutiny not only is it signed into law, but its 
constitutionality can never again be disputed in court; it is immune from future challenge. If the 
Bill does not survive, it is struck down and the government has a choice: to abandon the 
proposal, to adjust the proposal to fit the constitutional standards in place, or to propose 
constitutional change through a referendum to adjust those standards and permit introduction of 
the law (or its equivalent) in the future.  
 
The Article 26 procedure is not without its challenges and idiosyncrasies, but leaving to one side 
the debates about its general appropriateness and workability within the constitutional 
framework,30 it seems to have a clear clarificatory potential in the case of abortion for fatal foetal 
abnormalities. However, the government appears resolute in its position that it ought not to 
legislate against the advice of the Attorney general, the Attorney seems certain in her position 
that such legislation would be unconstitutional, and so the space for reimagining the 
constitutional contours of abortion law has been shrunk. Without a referendum, it seems, the 
Constitution offers no respite for women in situations of fatal foetal abnormality. 
 
III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
For these women, too, the European Convention on Human Rights has little to offer by means 
of a resolution, notwithstanding its incorporation into Irish law by the ECHR Act 2003. 
Although the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in A, B & C v Ireland31 can be credited 
in part with leading the Irish legislature to introduce the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
2013, it did not aid women in terms of challenging the very limited grounds upon which the 
Constitution permits access to abortion violated the Convention. 
 
30 On Article 26 see, for example, L Cahillane, “The Council of State and the Referral of Bills to the 
Supreme Court”, Constitution Project @ UCC, 29 July 2013. Available at 
http://constitutionproject.ie/?p=269 (2 July 2016). 
31 Supra n 4 
                                                        
This will not have been particularly surprising to anyone familiar with the Strasbourg Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence, which might be most politely described as a ‘fudge’.32 On the one hand, 
the Court claims that matters of intimacy related to people’s private decisions should generally be 
protected from state interference to the extent possible, so that states usually enjoy only a narrow 
Margin of Appreciation in the context of such matters.33 Abortion, however, is exempted from 
that narrow Margin of Appreciation. Instead, the Court has repeatedly found that the question of 
whether and, if so, in what situations abortion will be available is one on which states can decide 
without any effective supervision from the European Court,34 except to say that should a state 
decide to permit abortion it must ensure that abortion is actually accessible should a woman meet 
the domestic legal requirements.35 In other words, the Convention does not require abortion to 
be available; neither does it clearly establish that a total (or near total) ban on abortion (such as 
Ireland’s) would violate the Convention per se. It merely requires that a state must make sure that 
abortion is accessible to women who qualify for it under domestic legal rules. 
 
The Strasbourg jurisprudence on abortion shows little intellectual consistency with the generally 
narrow margin of appreciation for intimate decisions, as if abortion were not an intimate, private 
decision. Furthermore, the abortion jurisprudence confounds the general European consensus 
jurisprudence inasmuch as the Court appears to allow the “profoundly held” moral positions of 
the domestic polity (such as, in the Court’s estimation, that of the Irish people expressed in 
abortion referenda36) to override, or trump, clear European consensus towards a more liberal 
abortion regime.37 The Court, quite simply, has not yet figured out how to reconcile the multiple 
claims for rights (of women, and of fetuses whose rights-bearing status under the Convention 
has never been settled) and for sovereignty (of states to decide for themselves) in the fraught 
context of abortion.  
 
The European human rights system, then, holds no real potential for women in Ireland who are 
claiming a right to access abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality (or, indeed, more broadly): 
under the current jurisprudence any claim would fail in Strasbourg, suffocated by the Margin of 
Appreciation reasoning the Court uses to effectively avoid deciding on these difficult questions. 
 
32  For a comprehensive analysis see D Fenwick, “Abortion jurisprudence’ at Strasbourg: deferential, 
avoidant and normatively neutral?” (2014) 34 Legal Studies 214. 
33 See, for example, Handyside v. the United Kingdom [1976] ECHR 5. 
34 See for example Tysiac v Poland [2007] ECHR 212; A, B & C v Ireland supra n 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 A, B & C v Ireland, supra n 4. 
37 F de Londras & K Dzethsiarou describe this as the development of a ‘trumping internal consensus’: 
“Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, A, B and C v Ireland” (2013) 62 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 250. 
                                                        
IV. ENTER  THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
 
Both domestic constitutional challenges and European Convention on Human Rights challenges 
seem, then, unlikely to provide the legal ammunition needed to help shape and, indeed, cajole the 
political conversation around constitutional and legal reform in respect of fatal foetal 
abnormalities in Ireland. And so to international human rights law. Over recent years abortion 
reform activists have excelled in ensuring that the 8th Amendment and its implications for 
women are on the agenda when Ireland reports to international human rights treaty bodies and 
the Universal Periodic Review procedure in the United Nations.  
 
The Human Rights Committee,38 the Human Rights Council,39 the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,40 the Committee on the Elimination of all form of Discrimination 
against Women,41 the Committee on the Rights of the Child,42 and the UN Committee against 
Torture 43  have all encouraged the Irish government to revisit and revise the constitutional 
position on abortion in recent years. The Irish government, in contrast, has continued to argue 
that the status quo represents the profound moral choice of the Irish people and must be 
respected. What has been lacking up to now, however, is a concrete factual scenario in which the 
rights violations caused by the constitutional status quo can be identified. The recent decision of 
Mellet v Ireland, 44  decided by the Human Rights Committee pursuant to the First Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is that case.  
 
In the 21st week of her pregnancy, Amanda Mellet was informed that the foetus she was carrying 
had congenital heart defects that might be fatal. She was also informed that abortion in her 
circumstances was not permitted in Ireland, but that “[s]ome people in [her] situation may 
choose to travel”.45 Very shortly thereafter she was further informed that the foetus had trisomy 
18 and would die either before or shortly after birth; again she was informed that she could either 
carry her pregnancy to term or “travel”.46 To travel, in this context, is a euphemism widely used 
38  Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Ireland, 
CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, 19 August 2014, para 9. 
39 K Holland, “Government to consider UN abortion law recommendations”, Irish Times, 13 May 2016. 
40 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the third periodic 
report of Ireland, E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, 8 July 2015, para 30.  
41  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Comments: Ireland, 
CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/4-5, 22 July 2005, paras 38-39. 
42 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third and fourth 
period reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, 1 March 2016, paras 57-58. 
43  Committee against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee againt Torture: Ireland, 
CAT/C/IRL/CO/1, 17 June 2011, para 26. 
44 Supra n 7. 
45 Quotation from doctor as reported in Mellet v Ireland, [2.1]. 
46 Quotation from midwife as reported in Mellet v Ireland, [2.2]. 
                                                        
in Ireland for going abroad to access an abortion that is not available in Ireland. As it is 
prohibited for medical practitioners in Ireland to refer women to abortion providers elsewhere,47 
Ms Mellet was not offered a referral, but once she had decided to terminate her pregnancy a 
family planning organization provided her with information and contact details for Liverpool 
Women’s Hospital. The same organization faxed her medical records to the Liverpool Women’s 
Hospital. Before going to Liverpool, Ms Mellet confirmed whether a foetal heartbeat was still 
discernible. Had it not have been (i.e. had the foetus died without intervention) her medical care 
would have proceeded in Ireland, but when the foetal heartbeat was found Mellet’s GP 
reportedly discouraged her from accessing abortion.48 Notwithstanding that, however, Ms Mellet 
travelled to Liverpool Women’s Hospital where, following a course of treatment to end foetal 
life, she had a 36-hour labour resulting in delivery of a stillborn baby girl. As a result of financial 
limitations, she returned to Ireland with her husband just twelve hours later. Because the Irish 
hospital she had been attending, the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin, provided a bereavement service 
only to people who had suffered a spontaneous stillbirth and not to those who terminated their 
pregnancy having discovered a fatal foetal abnormality, she could not access such counseling, 
although she was given post-abortion counseling at the family planning organisation she had 
attended. Ms Mellet claimed that the grief and trauma she experienced was exacerbated by having 
to “endure the pain and shame of travelling abroad”.49 
 
Mellet argued that the result of Ireland’s abortion law was that her rights under Article 7 (the 
right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 17 
(the protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home or 
correspondence and from unlawful attacks on honour and reputation), Article 19 (the right to 
freedom of expression including the freedom to seek, receive and impact information and ideas), 
and Articles 2(1), 3 and 26 (the rights to non-discrimination and to the equal enjoyment of other 
rights on the grounds of sex and gender) had been violated. The Irish government’s response 
hinged fundamentally on the claim that Article 40.3.3 “represents the profound moral choices of 
the Irish people” who have also recognised the right to travel to another jurisdiction in order to 
avail of abortion. The legal regime, the government claims, reflected “the nuanced and 
proportionate approach to the considered views of the Irish Electorate on the profound moral 
question of the extent to which the right to life of the foetus should be protected and balanced 
against the rights of the woman”.50 
 
The Article 7 Claim 
47 Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 
48 Mellet v Ireland, [2.3]. 
49 Ibid, [2.5]. 
50 Ibid, [4.2]. 
                                                        
Article 7 of the ICCPR provides: 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical 
or scientific experimentation. 
 
Mellet argued that the Irish state had subjected her to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in 
four ways: (i) by failing to provide her with the reproductive health care and bereavement care 
she needed, (ii) by forcing her to carry a dying foetus, (iii) by compelling her to travel abroad to 
terminate her pregnancy, and (iv) by subjecting her to intense stigma.  
 
In response, the Irish government expended significant energy on establishing that this case was 
materially different to others the Committee had decided before. In particular, it distinguished 
this case from the Committee’s previous decision in KL v Peru51 as in this case Mellet had not 
been denied access to a procedure that was lawfully available, and that she had not experienced 
actions by state agents that could be said to be based on the personal prejudices of officials. 
There was, thus, no arbitrary interference with any right leading to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. The state also argued that any finding to the contrary would represent a step change in 
the Committee’s approach to the Covenant by holding the state accountability where there was 
“no act of ‘infliction’ by any person or State agent”.52 In essence, therefore, the State’s response 
to the Article 2 claim was to argue that because all that happened here was the application of law, 
embedded in the Constitution, there could be no violation of Article 2; it took no real account of 
the impact of this law on Ms Mellet, which had been at the core of her claim that there was a 
violation. 
 
The Article 17 Claim 
Article 17(1) of the ICCPR provides: 
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
 
Mellet argued that under Irish law she effectively “had to choose between…letting the state make 
the deeply reproductive decision for her to continue with a non-viable pregnancy under 
conditions of unimaginable suffering and…having to travel abroad for a termination”.53 Neither 
option respected or preserved her reproductive autonomy and, because she could not choose to 
terminate the pregnancy in Ireland, the State had arbitrarily interfered with her personal decision 
51 Communication No. 1153/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005). 
52 Mellet v Ireland [4.7]. 
53 Ibid, [3.5]. 
                                                        
making. In sum, she argued, “[d]efining the moral interest in protecting foetal life as superior to 
the author’s right to mental stability, psychological integrity and reproductive autonomy”54 was a 
disproportionate interference with her Article 17 rights. 
 
In response, Ireland argued that any interference with privacy experienced by the author was 
proportionate to the legitimate aims of the Covenant and of taking into account “a careful 
balance between the right to life of the foetus with due regard to that of the woman”.55 The 
Government reiterated that both the Irish electorate (in numerous referenda) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (in A, B & C v Ireland) had approved of how Irish law strikes this 
‘balance’. 56  Because the law that is said to reflect this balance applies equally to all those 
experiencing pregnancy in Ireland, there was no arbitrariness. Thus, any interference was 
proportionate and permissible.  
 
Once again, in respect of this claim, the Irish government’s response seems essentially to be that 
if it is lawful in domestic law (in this case, constitutionally provided for), then a law criminalizing 
abortion cannot be violatory of the international right in question. There is little if any 
engagement with the substance of the arguments made by Ms Mellet.  
 
The Article 19 Claim 
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides 
 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice. 
 
Mellet argued that the right to freedom of information includes information critical for making 
informed decisions about reproductive health. She argued that as the Regulation of Information 
(Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 prohibits the distribution 
of information to the public without solicitation (thus requiring women to specifically request 
information in order to receive it), and as the Act has been interpreted as effectively censoring 
health care providers from distributing even rudimentary information thus creating a “chilling 
effect”57 in which health care providers are reluctant to provide any information, her Article 19 
54 Ibid, [3.6]. 
55 Ibid [4.9]. 
56 Ibid [4.10] 
57 This phrase was used by the European Court of Human Rights when considering what was then the lack 
of legislation by which medical professionals could assess whether a woman could access a constitutionally 
permitted abortion in Ireland: A, B & C v Ireland, above n 4 [254]. 
                                                        
right was violated. She further argued that this restriction on the Article 19 right was 
discriminatory and disproportionate given its effects on women and its detrimental impact on her 
health and well-being.  
 
The Irish government offered only a brief response to this claim, arguing that it was insufficiently 
substantiated and in any case that by virtue of a midwife referring Ms Mellet to a family planning 
organization where she could acquire the information she sought there was no restriction on her 
right to freedom of information. Again, the state did not engage effectively with the claims made 
by Ms Mellet and, in particular, her arguments as to the impact of the Regulation of Information 
(Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 on both medical practice 
and women’s experience of maternal healthcare in Ireland. 
 
The Article 2(1), 3 and 26 claims 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
Article 3 provides: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present 
Covenant. 
 
Article 26 provides: 
 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
Mellet argued that the criminalization of abortion violates the Convention rights to non-
discrimination and equal enjoyment of other rights, which she argued required that health 
services recognise and accommodate fundamental biological differences between men and 
women as regards reproduction. She further argued that the criminalization of abortion is 
discriminatory per se because it “den[ies] women moral agency that is closely related to their 
reproductive autonomy”.58 Mellet further argued that in her case the discrimination was refined 
further because “she was a woman who needed this medical procedure in order to preserve her 
dignity, physical and psychological integrity, and autonomy” and that the criminalization of 
abortion in Ireland “traumatises and ‘punishes’ women who are in need of terminating their non-
viable pregnancies”.59 In criminalizing abortion, even in cases of fatal foetal abnormalities, she 
argued that Ireland prioritized the protection of the unborn over her health needs, and subjected 
her to the gender-based stereotype that women should continue with their pregnancies in all 
cases and regardless of their wishes or needs. In other words, she argued, she had been 
“stereotyp[ed]…as a reproductive instrument”60 so that having terminated her pregnancy she was 
not considered deserving of the counseling that women whose pregnancies resulted in foetal 
death were said to be deserving of. 
 
In response the State denied that Ms Mellet had suffered any discrimination and argued, in any 
case, that if she had it should be regarded as a reasonable and objective differentiation in 
treatment directed towards achieving a legitimate purpose. As to the former, this rested on the 
fundamental claim that there can be no invidious discrimination in relation to a woman who is 
pregnant given her “inherently different” 61  physical circumstances during pregnancy to the 
physical circumstances of a man. Even if there is a difference in treatment that might be said to 
be prima facie discriminatory, Ireland argued that any such differentiation is in pursuit of 
protecting foetal life and proportionate to that objective. Rather than stereotype the author, the 
state argued, its laws reflect “the inherent differentiation between a man and a pregnant woman 
[which] requires the careful balancing of rights of the foetus which is capable of being born alive, 
and the rights of the woman”.62 
 
The Committee’s Decision  
In a very significant decision, the Committee considered that Amanda Mellet had indeed suffered 
from violations of her ICCPR rights. It strongly rejected the core underpinning argument from 
the state—that Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution effectively determined the compatibility of 
Irish law with the ICCPR. In a particularly important finding, the Committee concluded that the 
existing legal framework in Ireland did indeed subject Ms Mellet to “intense physical and mental 
suffering”. The restrictive legal framework exacerbated her anguish upon finding that her 
58 Mellet v Ireland [3.15]. 
59 Ibid, [3.16]. 
60 Ibid, [3.19]. 
61 Ibid, [4.13]. 
62 Ibid, [4.15]. 
                                                        
pregnancy was not viable by preventing her from receiving medical care and insurance coverage 
in Ireland, by forcing her to choose between continuing with the pregnancy or going abroad 
“while carrying a dying foetus”63 in order to access abortion without familial support and at 
considerable expense, by requiring her to return when not fully recovered (because of financial 
constraints), by the failure of the state to provide her with appropriate post-abortion and 
bereavement care, and by subjecting her to “the shame and stigma associated with the 
criminalization of abortion of a fatally ill foetus”. 64  The restrictions on the provision of 
information, including on forms of abortion, further exacerbated this so that in sum these 
circumstances resulted in Amanda Mellet having suffered cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment in violation of Article 7. This is the first time that the Committee has found that the 
criminalization of abortion per se can result in violations of the ICCPR. 
 
The Committee also found that Mellet’s Article 17 rights had been violated. In this respect, the 
fact that the pregnancy was not viable was material. While the Committee accepted that the 
Article 17 right could be limited, it found that the limitations here were not reasonable taking 
into account the negative consequences to the author of having to travel to access abortion and 
the fact that the pregnancy was not viable. 
 
As to the discrimination claim, the Committee found a violation of Article 26 and then declined 
to consider the further claims under Articles 2(1), 3 and 19. In respect of Article 26, the 
Committee found that the relevant comparator was other “similarly situated women”65 and that 
when compared to them the differential treatment to which Ms Mellet was subjected failed to 
take adequate account of both her medical needs and her socio-economic circumstances so that 
it was not sufficiently reasonable, objective and pursuant of a legitimate purpose to excuse the 
differential treatment.  
 
A number of Committee members gave individual opinions, arguing that the Committee should 
also have found a violation of Articles 2(1) and 3., i.e. should have made a broader discrimination 
finding.  
 
Yadh Ben Achour noted that there is no similar restriction to the criminalization of abortion 
imposed on men, and that such legislation “denies women their freedom of choice in this 
domain”.66 For Ben Achour, then, the criminalization of abortion per se violates the right to be 
free from discrimination. Sarah Cleveland reached a similar conclusion in her individual opinion. 
63 Ibid, [7.14]. 
64 Ibid, [7.14]. 
65 Ibid, [7.11]. 
66 Concurring opinion of Yadh Ben Achour, para 4. 
                                                        
She strongly refuted the Irish government’s claim that there can be no discrimination where 
differential treatment is based on biological differences between men and women, stating baldly 
that such a view “is inconsistent with contemporary international human rights law and the 
positions of this Committee”.67 Drawing on General Comment No. 28, Cleveland noted that the 
nondiscrimination obligation requires states to adopt measures for the “effective and equal 
empowerment of women”.68 Making a clear finding of discrimination against women (and not 
only discrimination against Amanda Mellet when compared to “similarly situated” women), 
Cleveland wrote “Ireland’s near-comprehensive criminalization of abortion services denies access 
to reproductive medical services that only women need, and imposes no equivalent burden on 
men’s access to reproductive health care. It thus clearly treats men and women differently on the 
basis of sex for the purposes of article 26”.69 She was more receptive to Mellet’s argument that 
Irish law is based on stereotyping than were the majority of the Committee. Indeed, for 
Cleveland, “[r]equiring the author to carry a fatally impaired pregnancy to term only underscores 
the extent to which the State party has prioritized (whether intentionally or unintentionally) the 
reproductive role of women as mothers, and exposes its claimed justification in this context as a 
reductio ad absurdum”. 70 In their joint concurring opinion Victor Rodriguez Rescia, Olivier de 
Frouville, and Fabián Salvioli also opined that the Committee should have made a more 
comprehensive finding of discrimination, arguing that Irish law “is, in itself, discriminatory 
because it places the burden of criminal liability primarily on the pregnant woman”.71 
 
V. MELLET AND THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
 
It is clear from the preceding section that Mellet is a significant decision not only for abortion law 
in Ireland but more broadly. At the very least, it suggests that expansive criminalization of 
abortion to prohibit abortion in cases where the pregnancy is not viable violates the ICCPR, but 
it also has a broader reach. As further elaborated on below, the decision at least implies—and 
many of the concurring opinions establish—that criminalization of abortion per se can violate 
Covenant rights well beyond the specific conditions of fatal foetal abnormalities. However, 
within Ireland the immediate reaction to Mellet focused, as might be expected, on its implications 
for women whose pregnancies are not viable.  
 
The decision resulted in what has, by now, become a well-worn trend in Irish social and political 
commentary. Pro-reform advocates argued that this further reinforced the need for a referendum 
67 Concurring opinion of Sarah Cleveland, para 6. 
68 UNHRC, General Comment No. 28, Equality of rights between men and women (2000), para. 8.  
69 Concurring opinion of Sarah Cleveland, para 13. 
70 Ibid, para. 14. 
71 Concurring opinion of Victor Rodriguez Rescia, Olivier de Frouville, and Fabián Salvioli, para. 8. 
                                                        
on the 8th amendment and urgent reform of the law.72 Anti-choice and anti-reform advocates 
argued that this was decision was not binding on Ireland (so that no legal change was required by 
it), 73 and that what mattered was respect for the constitutional position as an expression of 
sovereign popular will.74 Politicians expressed regret, shock and sympathy, promised to carefully 
and unhurriedly consider change, and reinforced the “tragedy” of the case,75 but nevertheless 
noted that the Committee’s decision was “not binding”.76 They reinforced their position that 
legislative change on fatal foetal abnormalities was not possible in the absence of constitutional 
change. They established a Citizens Assembly to consider the possibility and form of 
constitutional change.77 The Minister for Health ensured that bereavement counseling and other 
supports would be made available to women who terminated their pregnancies in cases of fatal 
foetal abnormalities (although they still could not access abortion in Ireland). 78  Women 
continued to “travel” at a rate of around a dozen a week, and the domestic discussion zoned in 
ever-further on fatal foetal abnormalities as situations where the ability to access abortion in 
Ireland might be ‘acceptable’. 
 
There was little consideration, however, of whether and to what extent the reasoning in Mellet 
might extend beyond fatal foetal abnormalities, and reinforce the experiential claims of rights 
violation made by women in Ireland who seek, have sought, have accessed, and have been unable 
to access abortion since 1983. In reaching its conclusions, the Human Rights Committee 
repeatedly expressed its cognisance of the exacerbated suffering experienced by Amanda Mellet 
as a result of the fact that her foetus suffered a fatal abnormality. However, in spite of how it has 
72  See for example, Abortion Rights Campaign, Press release: UN Human Rights Committee says Ireland’s 
prohibition on abortion violates human rights, 10 June 2016; F de Londras, “Referendum required as UN move 
confirms abortion law is unsustainable”, Irish Times, 10 June 2016; Letter to the editor from 61 human 
rights lawyers outlining six policy and legal reasons for compliance with Mellet v Ireland, The Irish Times, 23 
June 2016. 
73 See, for example, David Quinn, “UN abortion ruling given undeserved credence”, The Irish Catholic, 16 
June 2016. 
74 See for example the letter to the editor of P Burke, Irish Times, 11 June 2016 claiming the importance of 
“asserting Ireland’s sovereignty and our right as a people to make our own decisions democratically”. 
75  For an eloquent rejection of the language and concept of tragedy in the context of fatal foetal 
abnormality see M Enright, ‘Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland—The Key Points”, Human Rights in Ireland, 9 
June 2016. Available at http://humanrights.ie/uncategorized/amanda-jane-mellet-v-ireland-the-key-
points/ (2 July 2016). 
76 P Leahy, “UN abortion ruling is not binding, Enda Kenny says”, The Irish Times, 15 June 2016. For a 
clear explanation of the status of the decision in international and domestic law see, for example, S 
Mullally, “Mellet v Ireland: Legal Status of the UN Human Rights Committee’s ‘Views’”, CCJHR Blog, 16 
June 2016. Available at http://blogs.ucc.ie/wordpress/ccjhr/2016/06/16/mellet-v-ireland-legal-status-un-
human-rights-committees-views-2/ (2 July 2016). 
77 The Citizens Assembly was part of the overall programme of government, and scheduled to be 
established in any case, but its actual establishment came in the late summer of 2016 and the timing 
seemed influenced by the Mellet decision. 
78 E Coyle, New bereavement help for overseas abortions”, The Times, 10 August 2016. 
                                                        
been received, it is not at all clear from the decision that the Committee’s conclusions are limited 
to situations of fatal foetal abnormality.  
 
While the Committee’s finding of discrimination is sustained by explicitly comparing the situation 
of women whose fetuses have fatal abnormalities and who choose to terminate their pregnancies 
as opposed to those who choose not to, the finding as to inhuman and degrading treatment 
under Article 7 does not rest on the particular circumstance of fatal foetal abnormalities. Many of 
the facets of Amanda Mellet’s experience that are picked up upon by the Committee are 
experienced by women who wish to access abortion for reasons other than fatal foetal 
abnormality.  The Committee especially notes the negative implications of Mellet’s inability to 
continue to receive medical treatment and health insurance coverage in Ireland, the expense and 
isolation of travelling for an abortion, the need to return to Ireland before she had fully 
recovered from her abortion, the “shame and stigma associated with the criminalization of 
abortion”,79 and the state’s refusal to provide her with necessary post-abortion care. To be sure, 
in the Committee’s decision all of these elements are framed as being exacerbations of the trauma 
associated with the pregnancy not being viable: not only did she have to travel, but she had to do 
so “while carrying a dying foetus”; not only did she lack appropriate post-abortion care but also 
bereavement care; not only did she have to return before being fully recovered but she had “to 
leave the baby’s remains behind and later [have] them unexpectedly delivered to her by 
courier”.80  
 
Even without these additional conditions, the inability of medics to make referrals as a result of 
the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 
1995, the need to travel, the expense and isolation associated with travel, the frequency with 
which women return “home” before having fully recovered from their abortions, the stigma, the 
lack of care, the difficulties in accessing medical care after abortions abroad: these are all 
common experiences of abortion for women in Ireland and all, at least arguably, result in 
inhuman and degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 7 of the ICCPR. As the concurring 
opinions of individual members of the Committee also show, they can be constructed as a form 
of gender based discrimination against women, and not only against women in situations of fatal 
foetal abnormality. In other words, Mellet v Ireland illustrates how the current constitutional and 
legislative framework in Ireland create conditions in which women who, for whatever reason, do 
not longer want to continue with their pregnancies routinely experience cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment in their attempts to make decisions as to their own reproductive autonomy, 
to access abortion elsewhere, and to access whatever supports they may need (for those who do 
79 Ibid, [7.14]. 
80 Ibid. 
                                                        
need them) when they return to Ireland. Mellet, then, not only further reinforces the need for 
constitutional change in Ireland in situations of fatal foetal abnormality, but in all situations 
where abortion is sought.  
 
The political clock is clearly ticking on the 8th Amendment; there is a popular appetite for change, 
but little consensus on what that change should be. It would be too easy for the government to 
put only a minimal change to the People; to ensure the Constitution allowed for abortion in cases 
on which there seems to be general agreement (rape, incest, risk to life, fatal foetal abnormalities, 
possibly serious risks to health) but to leave the general restriction on abortion undisturbed. 
What Mellet v Ireland shows is that such an approach would not resolve the deep-seated difficulties 
with Irish abortion law. Now is the time to address the reality that women in Ireland access 
abortion, but that in doing so they must take risks, endure suffering, and bear cruelty imposed 
not by circumstance or “tragedy”, but by the law. Only an approach to abortion law reform that 
recognises women’s human rights and autonomy can ever hope to address that. 
